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supplies, investigating their similarity to heterosexual decision-making, in a collective
household framework. Data from the 2000 US Census show that couples of all types
exhibit a significant response to bargaining power shifts, as measured by differences
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I. Introduction
This paper examines the labor supply choices of gay and lesbian couples, to explore the
role of intra-household bargaining power in same-sex household decision making. A large body
of theoretical and empirical literature models and shows that the intra-household distribution of
power influences heterosexual households’ outcomes (Chiappori, Fortin, Lacroix, 2002,
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, Lechene, 1994, Browning, Chiappori, 1998, Lundberg and
Pollak, 1996, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). In particular, the collective household behavior
model predicts that household members make Pareto-efficient decisions according to their
respective bargaining power positions, which in turn depend on outside opportunities and social
and legal factors, such as members’ relative share of non-labor income, their age differences, and
abortion and divorce laws (Browning et al., 1994, Chiappori et al., 2002, Oreffice, 2007,
Thomas, 1990).
However, all this literature is centered on heterosexual families, while nowadays there is
an important legal and cultural movement toward the legalization of same-sex marriages as
couples with the same rights and status as heterosexuals, e.g. the California’s Supreme Court
ruling legalizing same-sex marriages, and the New York governor providing legal status to samesex marriages performed elsewhere (May 2008). These recent social changes, along with the
sizable presence of homosexual partnerships throughout the country, prompt the compelling
question of whether the household economics developed around heterosexual families directly
applies to gay and lesbian family behavior, and how similarly to heterosexual couples.
I analyze same-sex couples’ labor supplies as a household decision, testing their response
to intra-household bargaining power, and their consistency with the collective household labor
supply behavior predicted for heterosexual couples. In particular, I focus on how gay and lesbian

1
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households’ balance of power and labor supplies are responsive to differences in age and nonlabor income between partners.
Economic studies of same-sex couples present both similarities and differences with
heterosexual households. Black, Sanders, Taylor (2007) assume that families’ preferences do not
systematically differ by sexual orientation. They instead emphasize the differences in biological
constraints, affecting homosexuals’ fertility, location, household specialization and human
capital choices. The similarities in family preferences is also found by Jepsen and Jepsen (2002),
in terms of positive assortative mating for non-labor and labor market traits across all types of
couples, even though to a smaller extent for same-sex couples. Becker (1991) highlights the
disparities between homosexual unions and heterosexual marriages due to the lack of difference
in comparative advantage between partners and to the presence of complementarities, stating that
same-sex households are less efficient than heterosexual ones. Jepsen and Jepsen (2006) and
Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) directly link sexual orientation to same-sex partners’ labor supply.
However, the former study considers labor supply an exogenous variable. The latter analyzes the
determinants of individual labor supply of same-sex partners, but each partner’s labor supply
decision is assumed to depend only on his/her own characteristics, completely disregarding the
influence of the other partner, and the household dimension of labor supply decisions. Finally,
there is evidence in the literature of persistent wage disparities among gay, lesbian and
heterosexual workers, with lesbians earning significantly more than heterosexual women, and
gay men earning significantly less than heterosexual men (e.g. Allegretto and Arthur, 2001,
Black, Makar, Sanders, Taylor, 2003, Blandford, 2003, Jepsen, 2007).
However, none of these studies examines the labor supply choices of same-sex couples as
a household endogenous decision. I test whether same-sex couples make efficient labor supply

2

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper240

4

Oreffice: Sexual Orientation and Household Decision Making. Same-Sex C

choices influenced by partners’ bargaining power, as it is found to be the case for heterosexual
households, and investigate possible differences in these effects across lesbian, gay, heterosexual
cohabiting and married couples. Pairs of same-sex male and female roommates are used as
comparison group. Black et al. (2007) and Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) suggest that family
preferences do not depend on sexual orientation, I want to check whether the intra-household
decision process and bargaining power as well do not vary with sexual orientation.
I focus on the differences in age and non-labor income ownership between partners, as
indicators of intra-household bargaining power. The distribution of these traits within a couple,
which captures each partner’s outside opportunities, is considered to affect the household
members’ bargaining position and to have a significant impact on household choices, such as
labor supply, clothing expenditure and children’s health (Browning et al., 1994, Schultz, 1990,
Thomas, 1990, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). Psychologists as well report that the partner with
greater financial resources has greater power, also in same-sex couples (Caldwell and Peplau,
1984, Patterson, 2000). When a partner has a relatively better trait (relatively richer or
younger/older), the distribution of gains from the relationship would shift in his/her favor,
generating opposite income effects on the partners. Consequently, the partner with a more
favorable bargaining position would decrease his/her labor supply, while his/her mate would
increase his/hers (Browning et al. 1994, Chiappori et al., 2002). I also test restrictions on these
partners’ labor supply responses,, which are predicted by the collective household labor supply
model, and compute the sharing rule partners use to divide their household non-labor resources,
highlighting the role of the age and non-labor income differences in determining the income
transfers within households. This evidence would strengthen the consistency and interpretation
of my findings, since it is very unlikely to hold unless the bargaining power explanation and the

3
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collective household approach are correct for same-sex couples as well, rejecting the unitary
model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-household decisions.
I use Census data for the year 2000, the five-percent sample of the Public Use Microdata
Set (PUMS), which provides the most recent largest sample of gay and lesbian partners and their
detailed demographic, labor and income information, along with standard samples of
heterosexual individuals. These data allow to identify only members of same-sex couples but not
single gays or lesbians. This limitation represents a lesser concern here, because my analysis
applies to couples. My identification strategy consists of estimating the effects of intra-household
age and non-labor income differences on both partners’ labor supplies, and comparing changes in
their labor supplies cross-sectionally among gay, lesbian, heterosexual couples and roommates.
My empirical analysis reveals that a relatively lower age (higher non-labor income)
significantly reduces the younger (richer) partner’s labor supply, while it significantly increases
the labor supply of his/her relatively poorer (older) mate, controlling for both partners’ wages,
education and other individual and household characteristics. Results are similar for gay, lesbian
and heterosexual cohabiting couples alike, while married (heterosexual) couples display more
bargaining power for the older spouse, and somewhat smaller labor supply effects. Consistently
with the intra-household bargaining interpretation, same-sex pairs of roommates do not show any
significant impact. In particular, in same-sex couples I find that being 5 years younger than your
lesbian partner reduces your labor supply by around 23 annual hours, while it increases your
mate’s labor supply by about 35 annual hours, the figures being 23 and 37, respectively, for gay
couples. Owning five thousand dollars more non-labor income than your lesbian partner reduces
your labor supply by around 19 annual hours, while it increases your mate’s labor supply by
about 47 annual hours (32 and 41 for gay partners).

4
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These findings represent the first empirical support for gay and lesbian households’ labor
supplies to be affected by bargaining power forces, according to the household behavior
framework predicted for heterosexual households.
Alternative explanations such as the role of age and non-labor income on individual
preferences for leisure, age and income differences as proxies for local labor market conditions
and attitudes toward gays and lesbians, household labor specialization, and the misreporting of
unmarried homosexual partners in the 2000 Census sample are considered. I argue that these
phenomena cannot consistently explain my results, given my intra-household bargaining
predictions and empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework. Section
3 describes the empirical specification and data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section
5 considers alternative explanations for the findings. Section 6 concludes the paper.

II. Theoretical Framework
I apply the collective household labor supply model with distribution factors, developed
by Chiappori et. al. (2002), to same-sex couples1. A household is composed of two decision
makers, head and partner, each having a distinct utility function on consumption and leisure.
Households are assumed to make Pareto-efficient decisions about each member’s leisure and
consumption. Preferences are egoistic, in that one mate’s utility does not depend on the other’s
consumption or leisure, although the model can be extended to allow for caring preferences and
also public goods. Let h i and C i for i = h, p denote member i’s labor supply and consumption of
a private composite good (whose price is normalized to unity). The utility function of member i

1

I also consider heterosexual couples in my empirical analysis.
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is U i (1 − h i , C i , z ) , where U is strictly quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable
for i = h, p, and z represents preference parameters, such as education of the two mates. Let y
denote household non-labor income and wi the wage rate of mate i. Finally, let s1 and s2 denote
two distribution factors, variables that affect the intra-household decision process, but not
individual preferences or the joint consumption set. The two bargaining power factors considered
in this analysis are the differences between mates in non-labor income and age. For simplicity, I
abstract from the non-pecuniary benefits of companionship. I follow convention and assume that
the utility from companionship is additive; in particular, it does not influence the trade-off
between leisure and consumption.
The optimal allocations of labor supply of each mate are determined by the following
program:

max h h ,C h U h (1 − h h , C h , z )
subject to

C h ≤ ϕ ( wh , w p , y, s1 , s 2 , z ) + wh h h
The partner faces a symmetric problem, ϕ ( wh , w p , y, s1 , s 2 , z ) representing the head’s share of
non-labor income y, and the partner receiving y - ϕ ( wh , w p , y, s1 , s 2 , z ) . This sharing

rule ϕ ( wh , w p , y, s1 , s 2 , z ) with which mates divide their non-labor household resources is Paretooptimally chosen by the couple and depends on the balance of bargaining power. In particular,
the stronger the head’s bargaining power, the higher his/her share of non-labor income and the
lower his/her partner’s. The sharing rule ϕ ( wh , w p , y, s1 , s 2 , z ) is a function of prices (here
normalized to unity), mates’ wages, household non-labor income, distribution factors (here the

6
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non-labor income gap and age gap)2, and other observable characteristics z (preference
parameters).
Solving these maximization problems yields the following equilibrium labor supply
functions of the two mates:
h h = h h [ wh , ϕ ( wh , w p , y, s1 , s 2 , z ), z ]
h p = h p [ w p , y − ϕ ( wh , w p , y, s1 , s 2 , z ), z ] .

The derivatives of each labor supply function with respect to the second arguments are
unambiguously negative, reflecting a pure income effect. Hence, factors that strengthen the
head’s bargaining power reduce the labor supplied by the head and increase the labor supplied by
the partner, ceteris paribus, in particular controlling for own wage and the couples’ total nonlabor income y. I investigate whether same-sex couples respond to such factors in the direction
predicted by the theory, by testing their impact on these couples’ labor supplies, and comparing
it to the corresponding effects on heterosexual cohabiting and married couples. Pairs of same-sex
roommates are also considered, as control group. Roommates share the mere cohabiting aspects
of couples, but do not constitute a household or couple, so that their relationship does not involve
intra-household bargaining and household decision making. Therefore, their labor supplies
should not be affected by the bargaining power shifts illustrated above, and the collective
household model predictions should not hold in their case.

2

The sex ratio, divorce laws, abortion legalization, alimony, and child benefits laws, are other

examples of distribution factors that have been studied in the literature on heterosexual
households (Chiappori et al, 2002, Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, Oreffice, 2007).
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This theoretical framework imposes further restrictions on the partners’ labor supplies
and on the parameters of the sharing rule, which I test in my empirical analysis. First, the labor
supply response to the two distribution factors should be proportional across partners3, i.e.:
∂h h / ∂s1 ∂h p / ∂s1
=
∂h h / ∂s 2 ∂h p / ∂s 2
Second, the sharing rule can be recovered up to an additive function k(z) and the partial
derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to its arguments are given by4:

hsp1

ϕy =

h yp
hsp1
h yp

−

hsh1

; ϕ wh =

h yh

hwph hsh1
⋅
h yp h yh
hsp1
h yp

−

hsh1

; ϕ wp =

h yh

h
hsp1
hwp
⋅
h yh h yp

hsp1
h yp

−

hsh1
h yh

; ϕ si =

hshj hsjp
⋅
h yh h yp
hsp1
h yp

−

hsh1

∀j = 1,2

h yh

All these predictions are very unlikely to be fulfilled unless my bargaining power explanation
and the collective household approach are correct and applicable to same-sex couples as well.
They would show that distribution factors have sizable effects on same-sex households’
decisions, and would reject the unitary model prediction that bargaining power forces are
irrelevant to intra-household decisions. In particular, a significant impact of the non-labor
income difference on partners’ labor supplies represents a rejection of the income pooling
hypothesis, which has been empirically rejected for heterosexual households (Browning et al.,
1994, Schultz, 1990, Thomas, 1990).

3

Propositions 1 and 3 in Chiappori et al. (2002).

4

Proposition 3 in Chiappori et al.(2002). These conditions hold provided that h yh ⋅ h yp ≠ 0 ,

where h ij is the partial derivative of hours worked of member i with respect to the variable j.
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III. Empirical Specification and Data
III.I Identification Strategy
My main sample consists of gay and lesbian couples with both partners between 18 and
65 years of age. I also consider heterosexual cohabiting and married men and women, and
roommates, all in the same age bracket. Moreover, all individuals in my samples are not in
school, not in the military, and not in a farm household. A couple consists of the head of the
household and his/her unmarried partner, spouse or roommate. I include intact couples only if
both the head and the mate are actually present, while I exclude households where there are
multiple mates, or more than two adults.
The following equations for labor supply are estimated for heads and partners, and run on
each type of couples, gay, lesbian, male roommates, female roommates, heterosexual cohabiting,
and married couples:
h h = α 1 ln w h + α 2 ln w p + α 3 y + γ 1 y _ diff + γ 2 age _ diff + δX + ε h
h p = β1 ln w h + β 2 ln w p + β 3 y + λ1 y _ diff + λ 2 age _ diff + ψX + ε p
y_diff and age_diff are the two bargaining power factors under consideration. The former is
defined as the head’s total non-labor income in dollars minus the partner’s total non-labor
income in dollars, while the latter as the head’s age in years minus the partner’s age in years (for
heterosexual couples, it is the male mate/spouse’s trait minus the female mate/spouse’s trait5).
5

Heterosexual mates are distinguished according to their gender. As customary in studies of

heterosexual households, the emphasis is on the role and behavior of male members versus
female members, rather than on the Census definition of head and unmarried partner/spouse,
where the head is the individual who owns the housing unit or signs the rental contract, and the
partner/spouse is the individual who identifies himself/herself as such.

9
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Both the individual non-labor income and age variables do not have any missing values and their
differences can be either positive or negative, or zero6.
My

identification

strategy

of

these

bargaining

power

effects

consists

of

estimating γ 1 and γ 2 for heads, and λ1 and λ 2 for partners. The impact of the non-labor income (age)
difference on the labor supply of heads and partners is captured by γ 1 and λ1 ( γ 2 and λ 2 )
respectively. According to the theory, if a partner is relatively richer, or being relatively young is
a favorable trait, then his/her labor supply should decline and the labor supply of his/her mate
should increase. Hence, γ 1 and λ 2 should be negative, while γ 2 and λ1 should be positive.
The other regressors are the wage rate w i of each mate i = h, p, the couple’s total non-labor
income y7, and a vector of covariates X. X includes education of each partner, number of each
partner’s own children living in the household, and only own age of mate i, so that the effect of

6

The ratio of non-labor incomes and the ratio of ages were used as alternative distribution

factors. However, the former is not defined for the several couples with no non-labor income,
and they both introduce non-linearities in the labor supply equations. Even though the ratios
yield the same pattern of bargaining power effects, the differences of non-labor incomes and
ages are preferred in this analysis (as in Browning et al., 1994). The difference (ratio) in
educational attainment across partners was also explored, but it did not exhibit any impact on
household labor supplies, as in Browning et al. (1994).
7

All wage and income variables refer to the previous year (1999). I discard individuals who are

self-employed, so that wages only reflect income from wages and salaries, and non-labor income
is constructed as the individual’s total income minus earned income, where earned income
coincides with wage income for non-self employed.

10
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age_diff can be identified. A dummy variable for being black rather than white is also included
at the household level, since I drop the few interracial unions present in my samples, and my
main specifications focus on black or white couples8. X also includes state fixed effects, which
should capture the different labor market opportunities and social and legal attitudes toward gays
and lesbians that exist across states. Alternatively, I include the state unemployment rate, the
state total labor force participation and female labor force participation, to control for the level of
economic activity in a state and especially for employment opportunities, and dummy variables
for the presence in a state of legal provisions for homosexual couples, such as domestic
partnerships and civil unions.
The dependent variable in my labor supply regressions is total annual hours worked in the
previous year. Households in which either the head or the partner does not work are also
included in my samples and I account for a possible selection bias toward working individuals by
correcting for sample selection with Heckman MLE9. As a source of identification, I use
distributional assumptions on the first step residuals alone or exclusion restrictions10. Both
procedures yield similar robust results. I use predicted wages to measure the non-working mates’
wages and to address the possible endogeneity of individuals’ observed wages. To predict
individuals’ wages, I take a standard human capital approach, also implemented in the collective
labor supply literature (e.g., Donni, 2007), and consider a wage equation in which wage depends
8

Including other races such as Asians does not alter my bargaining power estimates.

9

I only exclude household observations where neither the head nor the partner work, given that

this analysis measures bargaining power changes through labor supply.
10

The latter is young children only affecting the participation decision but not labor supply.

Tables report estimation with identification from statistical distribution assumptions.

11
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on the individual’s age, race, education, education squared, and cubed, but does not depend on
his/her partner’s characteristics. This equation is then estimated separately for participating gays,
lesbians, heterosexual male cohabitants, heterosexual female cohabitants, husbands, wives, male
and female roommates, in my samples, with a correction for selection bias11. The generated fitted
values then replace the wage observations of the corresponding individuals in my samples12.
Finally, Wald tests of overall statistical significance performed on the above labor supply
regressions do not reject the validity of the framework I use.
The labor supply regressions are run using robust standard errors clustered by state,
which allow for correlation of household observations within state. I alternatively clustered by
metropolitan area, even though a metropolitan area has not been assigned to almost a third of the
observations13. My specifications do not use a differences-in-differences estimator: heads’ and
partners’ regressions are estimated separately, across types of couples. As such, they should not
suffer from the understated standard errors highlighted by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004). At any rate, clustering by state (metropolitan area) should rectify such an
underestimation, if it is present.

11

The participation decision depends on the number of children, dummies for age brackets,

education, race and measures of local economy.
12

Tables report estimation with the predicted partner/spouse’s and own wages.

13

The Census reports that many metropolitan areas have only been partially identified in 2000,

and that “users should not assume that the identified portion of a partly-identified metropolitan
area is a representative sample of the entire metropolitan area”. Thus my main specifications are
clustered by state.

12
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III.II Additional Tests
The collective labor supply framework provides additional testable restrictions on the
impact of the non-labor income and age differences on mates’ labor supplies, and on how the
sharing rule varies with the distribution factors, non-labor income, and wages of each mate, as
illustrated in Section II. Specifically, I test the following interaction among the coefficients of the
partners’ labor supply equations:

γ 1 λ1
,
=
γ 2 λ2
for each type of couples, lesbian, gay, and heterosexual. I also use the following conditions on
their labor supply coefficients to obtain the corresponding sharing rule equation:

ϕy =

α 3 ⋅ λ1
Δ

; ϕ wh =

β1 ⋅ γ 1
Δ

; ϕ wp =

α 2 ⋅ λ1
Δ

; ϕ si =

γ i ⋅ λ1
Δ

∀i = 1,2

where Δ = λ1α 3 − γ 1 β 3 and s1 and s2 are the non-labor income difference and age difference,
respectively. Solving the above system of differential equations yields the following sharing rule
equation:

ϕ=

1
( β1γ 1 ln wh + α 2 λ1 ln w p + α 3 λ1 y + γ 1λ1 y _ diff + γ 2 λ1 age _ diff ) + k ( z )
Δ

identifiable up to an additive term k(z), since z affects both the sharing rule and the preferences
(Chiappori et al, 2002). All these conditions are tested and recovered through my estimation of
the coefficients of the partners’ labor supply equations.

III.III Data

Estimation is carried out on Census data for the year 2000, specifically the five-percent
sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS), which provides the most recent largest sample

13
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of gay and lesbian partners and their detailed demographic, labor and income information, along
with standard samples of heterosexual individuals. Unmarried “heads” and “unmarried partners”,
“heads” and “roommates”, and a random sample (10 percent) of married “heads” and “spouses”
were extracted from the Census. Records in these files were then matched on the household
identification code “serial” to create a single observation for each couple. All individuals with
imputed values for sex, marital status, and relationship to the head of the household were
excluded from my samples (subsection V.IV explains the relevance of this procedure). Couples
with the head and the partner sharing the same gender were then identified as same-sex couples,
gay and lesbian. In the Census, gays and lesbians are identified by their cohabiting relationship, a
household being recorded as a same-sex union if the “relationship to head” is specified as
“unmarried partner”, so that single gays or lesbians can not be recovered. This limitation
represents a lesser concern here, because my analysis applies to couples. However, most
economic studies on homosexuals use Census data, of 1990 or 2000. Others (e.g. Black et al.,
2003, Blandford, 2003) use the General Social Survey (GSS) data, where single gays and
lesbians can be identified, but the sample size is much smaller than in the Census data, and
sexual orientation is inferred from self-reported sexual activity.
Individual weights are used to make the sample representative of the US population and
economy. The state unemployment rate, state total labor force participation and female labor
force participation are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the heads’ and partners’ main variables, by

type of couple. In the same-sex samples, gays and lesbians on average work similar annual
hours, earn a similar hourly wage, and their education and age are also comparable. However,
within both gays and lesbian couples, heads work more hours than their partners, earn a higher

14
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wage, and are slightly more educated and older. On average, the age difference is about .83 for
lesbians and 1.57 years for gays, and the non-labor income difference is around $ 1,765 for gays
and $ 880 for lesbians. Heterosexual couples exhibit a higher annual labor supply and wage for
male than female mates, with the stronger disparity within married couples, while their
educational attainment is lower than same-sex couples (lowest for heterosexual cohabiting).
Husbands (male mates) are on average 2.14 (1.71) years older than their wives (female mates),
and their average non-labor income difference amounts to $ 2,898 (35.16). Pairs of roommates
exhibit very similar labor supply and wage patterns between mates, who also share the same
education level. Their average age and income differences are 1.24 and $ 892 in female pairs,
and 1.28 and $ 1043 for male roommates.

IV. Results
IV.I Main Evidence

The main results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The estimated effects of the non-labor
income difference and age difference are significant for both heads and partners, and their signs
go in the direction predicted by the theory. The point estimates indicate that in lesbian couples
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) being 5 years younger reduces the younger heads’ annual labor
supply by about 23 hours (P value = .045), while their partners’ is increased by 35 hours (P value
= .072). As to the other bargaining power variable, owning five thousand dollars more non-labor
income implies a decline in heads’ labor supply of 19 hours (P value = .043), and an increase in
their partners’ of 47 hours per year (P value = .002). Gay couples exhibit a similar impact
(columns 3 and 4 of Table 2). Their estimated coefficients correspond to -23 and 37 heads’ and
partners’ hours worked for a five year younger head (P values .088 and .02), while the impact of

15
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a five thousand dollar income gap amounts to -32 and 41 annual hours worked by heads and
partners, respectively (P values .004 and .031). The evidence clearly shows that all same-sex
couples exhibit statistically significant responses to bargaining power forces. The younger
(richer) partner holds a more favorable bargaining position and lowers his/her labor supply,
while his/her mate increases his/her labor supply. Moreover, these labor supply responses are not
statistically different between gay and lesbian couples. As reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table
2, the heterosexual cohabiting sample exhibits a similar pattern of effects to homosexual

households. Married couples differ from all types of cohabiting households in that they attribute
more bargaining power to the older spouse, and the magnitude of the effects of the income and
age differences is smaller, especially for females (columns 11 and 12 of Table 2). Specifically,
heterosexual cohabiting couples’ labor supply effects of a five year age difference are -18 and 20
hours, while a $ 5,000 income difference generates an estimated hour change of -21 and 27 hours
for male and female mates, respectively. For husbands and wives, the corresponding age and
income effects amount to 15 and -7 hours, and -17 and 14 hours.
These estimated bargaining power forces and labor supply responses are sizable,
corresponding to several days of work a year. The concurrent impact on both partners, and with
opposite outcomes, is remarkable given the acknowledged rigidities in the labor supplies, and the
frequency of the reported labor supply peaking around 40 hours of work per week. Traditional
analyses do not emphasize changes by both spouses, let alone their labor supply responding to
bargaining power forces. Moreover, no study finds that same-sex households’ labor supply
decisions reflect the collective household behavior of heterosexual couples and are influenced by
bargaining factors such as non-labor income ownership and age. The intra-household decision
process does not appear to vary by sexual orientation. These findings also show that income
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pooling does not hold for either heterosexual or same-sex couples. So far, the income pooling
hypothesis and the unitary model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intrahousehold decisions had been empirically rejected only for heterosexual households (Browning
et al., 1994, Schultz, 1990, Thomas, 1990).
As to the age gap, in both same-sex and opposite-sex cohabiting couples, the younger
mate exhibits more bargaining power, while married couples are found to value being relatively
old, controlling for wages and education of each partner and individual age. This evidence on
married households corresponds to what is found in the literature, where the spouses’ age
difference is considered a traditional measure of bargaining power, and the older spouse, not the
younger, has a favorable position (e.g. Browning et al., 1994, Lyons, Neelakantan, Fava, 2008).
These studies focus on household expenditures and financial decisions of married couples, and
do not control for wages, hours worked, or actual earnings, so that being older also captures
higher earning capacity and labor market opportunities, which are associated to more bargaining
power. However, I show that once individual labor market characteristics are disentangled from
age and specifically controlled for, married couples still value being relatively old, while relative
youth enhances bargaining power in all cohabiting relationships, across sexual orientations.
These results also match the evidence from psychological studies on family relationships.
Patterson (2000) reports that the partner with greater financial resources tends to have more
power within the couple, in both homosexual and heterosexual unions. Moreover, no difference
in break-up rates is found between lesbian and gay couples, with only married couples exhibiting
a lower dissolution rate (Caldwell and Peplau, 1984, Kurdek, 1998, Patterson, 2000). The more
stable and durable relationship of married couples may make spouses less responsive to outside
opportunities and bargaining power. This would explain why in all cohabiting relationship I find
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that the younger partner has more bargaining power, since cohabitants have lower barriers to
leave and younger individuals have better outside options. The signal conveyed by relative youth
about the quality of outside opportunities may be more relevant for cohabiting rather than
married couples, and represent a more credible threat, because the former are aware that their
household is less stable, lacking the commitment of legal marriage (Kurdek, 1998). In married
couples, the life experience, knowledge and maturity of the older spouse play an important role
of guidance in the stability of the relationship and are valued by the younger spouse (Fava et al.,
2008). Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) as well find that same-sex couples are more similar to
cohabiting than to married opposite-sex couples. Finally, wives’ smaller bargaining power
effects may be also due to stronger rigidities in their labor supply schedules. The more common
presence of children within marriage than in cohabiting couples, and especially than in same-sex
couples14, may make spouses, and wives in particular, less likely to respond to bargaining power
in terms of labor supply shifts.
As to the other covariates in the labor supply equations, most parameter estimates for all
couples are comparable to the literature. In particular, the mates’ own wage response is always
positive significant, as is the cross-wage effects between mates’ labor supplies (Table 3). The
couple’s total non-labor income and own age have a negative effect on labor supply, while
education has a positive impact, although the coefficients are not always precisely estimated.
Being black is associated with fewer hours of work, as own household children, except for
heterosexual male mates for whom children have a positive effect on labor supply. This is mostly
in line with the findings in the family labor supply literature. For instance, Chiappori et al.
14

In my samples, the average number of household children is 1.29 in married couples, .90 in

heterosexual cohabiting couples, and .40 and .23 in lesbian and gay couples.

18

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper240

20

Oreffice: Sexual Orientation and Household Decision Making. Same-Sex C

(2002) run similar spouses’ labor supply equations and show positive significant cross wage
effects, negative own age estimates and positive significant own wage effects for wives.
The bargaining power effect is also estimated on pairs of male and female roommates.
The results are detailed in columns 7 to 10 of Table 2. Their labor supply regressions show no
significant impact of either the income or age differences, as theory predicts. This lack of impact
on roommates strengthens my bargaining power interpretation of the labor supply responses of
same-sex and opposite-sex couples’. Finally, the disparity between same-sex couples’ and
roommates’ behavior confirms that the sample of same-sex couples is indeed formed by
homosexual partners rather than by roommates who wrongly identify themselves as “unmarried
partners”.
These findings represent the first empirical support for the labor supplies of gay and
lesbian households to be affected by bargaining power forces, and emphasize that same-sex
household decision making reflect heterosexual households’ behavior, more closely to
cohabiting than married couples. Bargaining power is found to be positively related to non-labor
income ownership in all types of couples, whereas relative youth increases bargaining power in
all cohabiting couples but decreases it in married couples.
Further evidence presented below, together with the discussion of various alternative
explanations, should help making my results convincing and contribute to the understanding of
the economic behavior of gay and lesbian families.

IV.II Additional Findings

I test the restrictions on the proportionality of the partners’ labor supply responses to the
non-labor income and age differences, and I recover the estimated effects of non-labor income,
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mates’ wages and the two bargaining power factors on the sharing rule, as illustrated in sections
II and III.II.
Results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. As predicted by the theory (the condition
h yh ⋅ h yp ≠ 0 holds in my samples), the ratios of the coefficients on y_diff and age_diff are not

statistically different across mates, and this proportionality holds for all types of couples, as
shown in Table 4. Table 5 reports the estimated parameters of the sharing rule. In lesbian
couples, a five years age gap (a $ 5,000 non-labor income gap) will induce the older (poorer)
partner to transfer an additional $ 1915 ($ 1560) of the couple’s non-labor income to the younger
(richer) partner. In gay couples, these figures correspond to transfer an additional $ 1515 ($
2100) of income to the younger (richer) partner. In heterosexual cohabiting couples, a more
favorable bargaining position increases the younger (richer) partner’s share of income by $ 1360
($ 1600), while in married couples being 5 years older ($ 5,000 richer) corresponds to an
increase in $ 865 (980) of the older (richer) spouse’s share. These findings suggest that
bargaining power forces do affect the intra-household allocation of resources, of same-sex
couples as well. Table 5 also shows that earning higher wages translates into the transfer of more
non-labor income to the higher earner, and that a $ 1.00 increase in the couple’s total non-labor
income increases the head’s share of household non-labor income by 70 cents for lesbians, 34
cents for gay couples, 54 cents for cohabiting and 38 cents for married couples.
Distribution factors have sizable effects on same-sex households’ decisions. The unitary
model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-household decisions, and
the income pooling hypothesis, are rejected for all households alike, homosexual or heterosexual,
cohabiting or married.
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V. Alternative Explanations

The predicted opposite labor supply effects on both mates, the lack of any impact on
roommates, and the proportionality restrictions are very unlikely to hold unless my bargaining
power explanation and the collective household approach are correct and applicable to same-sex
couples. Furthermore, I argue that the following phenomena cannot consistently explain my
results, given my intra-household bargaining predictions and empirical evidence.

V.I Bargaining power variables as proxies for local labor market conditions and attitudes
toward gays and lesbians

It may be possible that the labor supply of the younger or richer homosexual partner falls
not as a result of the bargaining power effect, but due to poor local economic opportunities
and/or unfriendly attitudes toward gays or lesbians. Similarly, it could be that younger and richer
heterosexual women work less, and their male partners work more, because they face worse job
opportunities than men. There are at least three reasons to believe that the local economy and
attitude hypothesis does not provide a plausible alternative explanation for my findings. First, my
labor supply regressions include individuals’ wages and education, own age, and state fixed
effects (alternatively, state unemployment rate, total and female labor force participation rate,
and dummy variables for state legal provisions for homosexual couples) which account for the
variation in labor market opportunities and attitudes. My findings are also robust to adding
individual controls for occupation categories in my labor supply regressions. Second, the
predicted labor supply changes have a distinctive opposite impact on the members of each type
of couple. It is difficult to understand why the labor supply of a gay or lesbian individual should
be lower while his/her partner is higher, when they share the same gender and sexual orientation,

21

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

23

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 240 [2008]

and thus the same labor market conditions and potential earnings discrimination. Third, gay and
lesbian workers exhibit an opposite earnings differential with respect to their heterosexual
counterparts, lesbians earning significantly more than heterosexual women, and gay men earning
significantly less than heterosexual men (Allegretto and Arthur, 2001, Black et al., 2003, Jepsen,
2007). If it were a gender effect, labor market conditions would not explain my findings of a
same pattern of results for gays, lesbians and heterosexuals alike. Finally, pairs of male and
female roommates do not exhibit any labor supply effect of age and income differences, while
sharing the same gender and labor market characteristics as homosexual couples. As to
heterosexual couples, it is hard to reconcile with labor market disparities the opposite effect of
relative age on cohabiting and married individuals, when they share the same gender, sexual
orientation and similar age, wage and education profiles.

V.II Age, non-labor income and labor supply

Controlling for own age and wage, the age difference between mates should not capture
an individual’s marginal utility of leisure and affect his/her labor supply through this channel.
However, younger cohabitants do not work less than older or married workers, as instead my
bargaining power effects show. Matching preferences either do not provide a plausible
alternative explanation for my findings. Older individuals may prefer to have a partnership with
younger persons, but this youth value does not translate into a lower preference for leisure.
Matching with younger individuals does not necessarily affect the marginal utility from leisure
making the older partner work more. Actually, the opposite may be more likely, the younger
your companion is, the more you value leisure and the less you work. On the other hand, if an
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older partner needs to work more hours to earn more income to “buy” a relationship with a
younger partner, then this exactly illustrates the bargaining power effect at stake in this study15.
The same reasoning holds for non-labor income differences. In particular, if non-labor
income is endogenous to labor supply choices, then it is likely that high non-labor income
suggests high labor supply. If an individual’s disutility from work is low, he/she works many
hours and as a result owns a high non-labor income. However, this endogeneity bias can not
explain my findings since it would predict more hours of work with higher income, whereas my
bargaining power effects predict that higher non-labor income differences lead to lower labor
supply, and roommates do not exhibit any labor supply impact. Finally, non-labor income has
been treated as an exogenous measure of bargaining power by the literature (Browning et al,
1994 and Thomas, 1990).

V.III Household specialization

Bargaining power variables such as income and age difference may somewhat capture
differential productivity in household production. However, controlling for own age, and
education and wages of both mates, should ensure that comparative advantage and household
productivity is disentangled from my bargaining power measures. Besides, there is no specific
economic reason why the younger partner should specialize in household production and work
less, while the older partner works more in the labor market, married couples exhibiting the
opposite pattern. A similar argument holds for non-labor income ownership. Being relatively
richer does not imply being more productive at home and working less in the labor market. Also,
15

The same, reversed, argument holds for married couples, for whom being relatively old is the

favorable trait.
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this specialization pattern would not necessarily be present in all types of couples, gay, lesbian
and heterosexual alike. Finally, the literature emphasizes the specialization effect mainly for
married heterosexual couples, while most of my samples consist of unmarried couples, including
homosexuals.

V.IV Misreporting of same-sex partners in the Census data

The Census identifies same-sex partners by their cohabiting relationship with an
individual of the same gender who records his/her “relationship to the head of the household” as
“unmarried partner”. Unfortunately, the 2000 Census modified the relationship to head from
“spouse” to “unmarried partner” and/or the marital status from married to unmarried, for couples
with both mates of the same sex, without signaling the allocated values in the flag variable of
relationship to head. As documented in Black et al. (2006), this procedure lead to consider
several heterosexual married couples as same-sex couples who wrongly reported their sex or
relationship to head. To avoid this misclassification, all individuals with imputed values for
marital status, sex, and relationship to head were excluded from my samples, using the
corresponding “q” variables which flag allocated values, as suggested by Black et al. (2006) and
Jepsen and Jepsen (2002). Overall, more than forty percent of same-sex couples are dropped
because of these imputed values, whereas only very few heterosexual couples are affected (four
percent of cohabitants and less than one percent of married couples). This process ensures that
the same-sex couples at stake are real homosexual partnerships, rather than heterosexuals
misreporting their gender or relationship to head, although homosexuals who wrongly identify
themselves as married are also dropped (by year 2000, no US state had legalized same-sex
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marriages)

16

. The concern that sentimentally un-related individuals voluntarily identify

themselves as unmarried partners (rather than roommates) is minimal, given the stigma attached
to homosexuality. However, both of these last two instances of mis-reporting would work against
my findings of same-sex couples behaving as heterosexual families. Finally, sexual orientation is
inferred from self-reported data and under-reporting of homosexual status (identifying as
“unmarried partner”) may be correlated with demographic characteristics such as education and
income. At any rate, there is no reason why mis-reporting is more severe in the Census than in
the other smaller homosexuals’ data sets, and in principle it may occur in many data sets and
variables.

VI. Conclusions

This is the first study of same-sex couples’ labor supplies as an endogenous household
choice, and the first empirical support for gay and lesbian households’ labor supplies to be
affected by bargaining power forces, in the direction predicted by the theory for heterosexual
households. In particular, I show that gay and lesbian couples do behave as heterosexual couples,
their labor supplies being responsive to differences in age and non-labor income between
partners. At the same time, no effect is found on same-sex pairs of roommates, consistently with
the household bargaining interpretation.
Using 2000 US Census data, I find that each gay and lesbian partner’s labor supply is
negatively related to their level of bargaining power. Specifically, a relatively lower age (higher
non-labor income) significantly reduces the younger (richer) partner’s labor supply, while it
16

Including the observations with Census-allocated marital status yields very similar patterns of

bargaining power effects, at higher significance levels.
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significantly increases the labor supply of his/her relatively older (poorer) mate, controlling for
both partners’ wages, education and other individual and household characteristics. Results are
similar for gay, lesbian and heterosexual cohabiting couples alike. Married couples attribute a
more favorable position to the older spouse, or the richer, with significant but somewhat smaller
bargaining power effects. Additionally, I cannot statistically reject the proportionality constraints
on the partners’ labor supply responses to the two bargaining power factors, as predicted by the
collective household labor supply model. Finally, the sharing rule with which partners divide
their household non-labor resources is recovered, highlighting that a favorable age difference
and/or non-labor income difference increases a mate’s allocated income share, in all types of
couples.

26

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper240

28

Oreffice: Sexual Orientation and Household Decision Making. Same-Sex C

References

1. Allegretto, S., Arthur, M.M. (2001), “An empirical analysis of homosexual/heterosexual
male earnings differentials: unmarried and unequal?”, Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 54-3, 631-646
2. Becker, G. (1991), “A Treatise on the Family”, Harvard University Press
3. Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. (2004), “How Much Should We Trust
Differences-in-Differences Estimates? ”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119-1, 249275
4. Black, D.A., Sanders, S.G., Taylor, L.J. (2007), “The Economics of lesbian and gay
families”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21-2, 53-70
5. Black, D.A., Gates, G, Sanders, S.G., Taylor, L.J. (2006), “The measurement of same-sex
unmarried partner couples in the 2000 US Census”, mimeo
6. Black, D.A., Makar, H., Sanders, S.G., Taylor, L.J. (2003), “The effects of sexual
orientation on earnings”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56-3, 449-469
7. Black, D.A., Gates, G, Sanders, S.G., Taylor, L.J. (2000), “Demographics of the gay and
lesbian population in the US: evidence from available systematic data sources”,
Demography, 37-2, 139-154
8. Blandford, J.M. (2003), “The nexus of sexual orientation and gender in the determination
of earnings”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56-4, 622-642
9. Browning, M., Bourguignon, F., Chiappori, P.-A., Lechene, V., (1994), “Income and
outcomes: a structural model of intra-household allocation”, Journal of Political
Economy, 102, 1067-1096

27

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

29

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 240 [2008]

10. Browning, M., Chiappori, P.-A. (1998), “Efficient intra-household allocations: a general
characterization and empirical tests”, Econometrica, 56, 1241-1278
11. Caldwell, M.A., Peplau, L.A. (1984), “The balance of power in lesbian relationships”,
Sex Roles, 10-7/8, 587-599
12. Chiappori, P.-A, Fortin, B. and G. Lacroix (2002), “Marriage Market, divorce legislation,
and household labor supply”, Journal of Political Economy, 110-1, 37-72
13. Donni, O. (2007), “Collective female labor supply: theory and application”, Economic
Journal, 117-516, 94-119
14. Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (1993), “On the economics of marriage. A theory of marriage,
labor and divorce”, Westview Press
15. Kurdek, L.A. (1998), “Relationship outcomes and their predictors: longitudinal evidence
from heterosexual married, gay cohabiting, and lesbian cohabiting couples”, Journal of
Marriage and the Family, 60-3, 553-568
16. Jepsen, L. (2007), “Comparing the earnings of cohabiting lesbians, cohabiting
heterosexual women, and married women: evidence form the 2000 Census”, Industrial
and Labor Relations Review,
17. Jepsen, C. and Jepsen, L. (2006), “The sexual division of labor within households:
comparisons of couples to roommates”, Eastern Economic Journal, 32-2, 299-312
18. Jepsen, L. and Jepsen, C. (2002), “An empirical analysis of the matching patterns of
same-sex and opposite-sex couples”, Demography, 39-3, 435-453
19. Lyons, A, Fava, A, Neelakantan, U. (2008), “Household bargaining and portfolio
choice”, mimeo, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

28

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper240

30

Oreffice: Sexual Orientation and Household Decision Making. Same-Sex C

20. Lundberg, S., Pollak, R. (1996), “Bargaining and distribution in marriage”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 10-4, 139-158
21. Oreffice, S. (2007), “Did the legalization of abortion increase women’s household
bargaining power? Evidence from labor supply”, Review of Economics of the Household,
5-2, 181-207
22. Patterson, C.J. (2000), “Family relationships of lesbians and gay men”, Journal of
Marriage and the Family, 62, 1052-1069
23. Schultz, T.P. (1990), “Testing the neoclassical model of family labor supply and
fertility”, Journal of Human Resources, 25, 599–634
24. Tebaldi, E., Elmslie, B. (2006), “Sexual orientation and labour supply”, Applied
Economics, 38-5, 549-562
25. Thomas, D. (1990), “Intra–Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach”,
Journal of Human Resources, 25, 635–664

29

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

31

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 240 [2008]

Table 1. Summary Statistics
Lesbian Couples

Gay Couples

Heads

Partners

Heads

Partners

Variable

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

Age_diff
Y_diff
Hours worked*
Log of wage*
Age
Education
Couple's non-labor income Y
Number of children
Dummy for black
Number of observations

0.83
6.72
880.4 11380
2069 537.06
3.02
0.35
38.42
9.03
14.4
2.33
3799 12340
0.36
0.78
0.08
0.27
2950

0.83
6.72
880.4 11380
1990.1 567.66
2.35
0.68
37.6
8.98
14.12
2.36
3799 12340
0.056
0.28
0.08
0.27
2950

1.57
7.92
1765 19971
2185 615.72
3.09
0.31
41.17
8.88
14.63
2.19
6809 21461
0.12
0.51
0.05
0.22
2588

Female Roommates

Variable

Heterosexual Cohabiting Couples
Male Mates

Female Mates

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

1.57
7.92
1765 19971
2065.1 615.88
2.37
0.64
38.66
9.19
14.22
2.27
6809 21461
0.11
0.14
0.05
0.22
2588

1.71
6.6
35.16 12695
1958.6 837.64
2.87
0.28
39.22
9.45
12.73
2.2
4072 13628
0.351 0.825
0.16
0.36
68762

1.71
6.6
35.16 12695
1663 855.75
2.01
0.64
37.51
9.03
12.93
2.12
4072 13628
0.54 0.959
0.16
0.36
68762

Male Roommates

Heads

Partners

Heads

Partners

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

Age_diff
1.24
7.24
1.24
7.24
1.28
7.24
1.28
7.24
Y_diff
891.9 12418
891.88 12418
1044 12249
1044 12249
Hours worked*
1989 636.04
1936 649.81
2081 671.75
2023 675.4
2.81
0.26
2.72
0.25
2.85
0.29
2.76
0.24
Log of wage*
35.54 11.79
34.3 11.57
32.96 10.48
31.68
9.65
Age
14.24
2.33
14.04
2.32
13.68
2.31
13.43
2.3
Education
4482 15284
4482 15284
3524 13907
3524 13907
Couple's non-labor income Y
0.213
0.62
0.025
0.2
0.036 0.245
0.003
0.06
Number of children
0.06
0.24
0.06
0.24
0.06
0.24
0.06
0.24
Dummy for black
8480
8480
9657
9657
Number of observations
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS).
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
In heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.
*For women and men with positive hours of work.

Heterosexual Married Couples
Husbands

Wives

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

2.14
2898
2108
3.18
44.09
13.43
5926
1.29
0.08
96650

2.14
4.46
2898 17062
1318
951
1.96
0.88
41.95
10.2
13.35
2.28
5926 19699
1.29
1.2
0.08
0.27
96650

4.46
17062
788
0.36
10.48
2.48
19699
1.2
0.27
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Table 2. Labor Supply Effects of Age and Non-Labor Income differences on Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples

Lesbian Couples
Heads
(1)
Age_diff

Y_diff
Number of observations

4.61 **
(2.30)

Gay Couples

Partners
(2)
-6.97 ***
(3.88)

-3.94***
(.454)

-.0042 ***
(.0006)

.0053***
(.0007)

.0081 **
(.0038)

2950

2950

2588

2588

Male Roommates
Heads
(9)

Female Mates
(6)

3.57 ***
(.52)

-.0065 *
(.0022)

Partners
(8)

Male Mates
(5)

-7.48 **
(3.21)

.0095 *
(.0031)

Heads
(7)

Y_diff

4.67 ***
(2.74)

Partners
(4)

-.0037 **
(.0018)

Female Roommates

Age_diff

Heads
(3)

Heterosexual Cohabiting Couples

Partners
(10)

68762

68762

Heterosexual Married Couples
Husbands
(11)

3.44
(3.56)

-0.875
(1.87)

3.01
(2.68)

2.15
(2.01)

-3.003 ***
(.608)

.0007
(.0006)

.0002
(.0006)

-.0011
(.009)

-.001
(.0009)

-.0034 ***
(.0004)

8480
8480
9657
9657
96650
Number of observations
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS).
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section III. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.

Wives
(12)
1.43**
(.688)
.0028***
(.0008)
96650
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Table 3. Estimation of the Labor Supply Regressions of Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples

Lesbian Couples
Heads

Partners

(1)

Age_diff
Y_diff
Couple's non-labor income Y
Log of wage of head
Log of wage of partner
Own Age
Education of head
Education of partner
Number of children of head
Number of children of partner
Dummy for Black

Gay Couples
Heads

(2)

Partners

(3)

(4)

Heterosexual
Cohabiting Couples
Male
(5)

Heterosexual
Married Couples

Female

Husbands

Wives

(6)

(7)

(8)

4.61 **
-6.97 ***
(2.30)
(3.88)
-.0037 ** .0095 *
(.0018)
(.0031)

4.67 ***
-7.48 **
(2.74)
(3.21)
-.0065 *
.0081 **
(.0022)
(.0038)

3.57 ***
-3.94 ***
(.521)
(.454)
-.0042 *** .0053***
(.0006)
(.0007)

-3.003 ***
1.43 **
(.608)
(.688)
-.0034 ***
.0028 ***
(.0004)
(.0008)

-.0086
(.0015)
175.20
(57.05)
171.98
(73.09)
-1.81
(2.31)
68.02
(21.99)
125.53
(90.64)
-45.40
(15.43)
71.42
(43.73)
-117.43
(47.43)

-.0052
(.0018)
270.83
(61.08)
310.98
(423.69)
-6.09
(2.49)
-91.83
(39.74)
10.67
(25.86)
-17.53
(41.07)
32.46
(91.61)
-173.89
(66.84)

-.007
(.0004)
172.94
(40.29)
92.37
(17.26)
-6.20
(.678)
17.47
(3.79)
-82.81
(16.43)
22.17
(4.83)
-22.73
(3.29)
-144.73
(8.91)

-.0066
(.0004)
161.62
(30.99)
192.06
(38.08)
-7.49
(.71)
10.5
(3.44)
-90.60
(11.61)
18.46
(2.09)

-.0085
(.0035)
*** 558.17
(285.06)
151.71
** (22.92)
-4.92
(4.05)
176.70
**
(105.56)
-6.27
(12.10)
*** -50.58
(13.43)
*
-16.54
(48.47)
*** -108.35
(54.10)
***

**
**
***

*

***

**

***
***

**
**
*

***
***

-.0128 ***
(.0032)
217.27
(235.95)
104.62 ***
(26.04)
-4.75
(3.66)
-15.25
(31.71)
14.02
(14.63)
-33.68
(31.51)
-116.08
(139.93)
-214.40 **
(108.73)

-.0076
(.0005)
***
194.39
(36.23)
***
590.57
(283.88)
***
0.35
(.485)
***
4.22
(6.16)
***
38.28
(26.94)
***
-83.86
(4.27)
***
-32.98
(4.54)
***
5.39
(11.54)
***

***
***
**

***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***

-.0087
(.0008)
179.49
(43.89)
137.83
(32.23)
-3.07
(.598)
-42.78
(7.29)
46.87
(20.64)
-110.00
(4.77)

***
***
***

***
**
***

dropped because same as
number of head's children
-246.65 ***
(11.66)

152.77 *
(24.79)

2950
2950
2588
2588
68762
68762
96650
96650
Number of observations
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS).
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section III. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.
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Table 4. Proportionality Tests on the Effects of Age and Non-Labor Income Differences on Lesbian, Gay and Heterosexual Couples

Estimated Ratio of Coefficients
Lesbian Couples
Heads

Partners

(1)

coefficient of Y_diff
coefficient of Age_diff

(2)

-.0008 **
(.0037)

Test of equality of this ratio
between heads and partners

Number of observations

-.0013 *
(.0008)

Gay Couples
Heads

(4)

-.0014 *
(.0011)

P = .34

2950

Partners

(3)

-.0011 *
(.0006)

Heterosexual
Cohabiting Couples
Male

P = .35

2950

2588

Female

Husbands

Wives

(6)

(7)

(8)

(5)

-.0011 ***
(.0002)

Heterosexual
Married Couples

-.0013 ***
(.0002)

'.0011 ***
(.0002)

P = .489

2588

68762

68762

.0019*
(.001)

P = .367

96650

96650

Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS).
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated ratio of coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait. Heads and partners become male and female mates.
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Table 5. Sharing Rule for Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples

Estimated Coefficients of the Head's share of a couple's non-labor income
Lesbian Couples

Gay Couples

Heterosexual

Heterosexual

Cohabiting Couples

Married Couples

Age_diff

-383

-303

-272

173

Y_diff

.312

.420

.32

.196

.71

.34

.54

.38

18358

11205

11760

12844

-14301

-20174

-7041

-11096

2950

2588

68762

96650

Y
log of wage of head
log of wage of partner

Number of observations

Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS).
The above coefficients represent the change in the head's share of the couple's non-labor income Y.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.
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